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Medical malpractice is one area that is rife in Kenya and yet not well established in law, 
policy and practice. There is a disciplinary body, established by law that ought to be working 
on correcting this phenomenon. This research study sought to examine the efficiency of the 
disciplinary process for medical malpractice regulation in the country.  
What it found was that the law was inadequate in that it merely focuses on punishing the 
offenders and does not have provisions for ways in which the victim may be compensated or 
granted legal remedies. In addition, this study found that the Kenya Medical Practitioners and 
Dentists Board, tasked with representing the doctors and also regulating medical malpractice 
is marred by conflicts of interest as it is geared towards protecting the practitioners, its own 
peers, as opposed to the public.  
This study recommends that the medical profession no longer remain a self-regulated 
profession. At a time when many countries are moving away from placing both representative 
and regulatory roles in one body for good reason, it is only right that Kenya take the same 
path in order to rectify its disciplinary process. It also emphasises on the need for a more 
victim-restorative oriented reform that seeks to suggest ways in which the victim can achieve 
the justice they need. Punishing the offender does not return them to the position they were in 
before the occurrence of the negligent acts. Very rarely do complainants leave the Board 
content.  
It is also necessary for the Kenya Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board to be more 
transparent in its operations. Majority of Kenyans are not aware that there is a body mandated 
to deal with their complaints on negligent actions by doctors and so they do not take action 
thereby providing more leeway for practitioners to get away with their misdeeds. 
This study essentially calls for an overhaul of the current malpractice system. The CoK 2010 
paved the way for health reform in Kenya and now the public is more aware and expectant of 
the fulfilment of their rights, which must be upheld.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Pursuant to Article 43(1)(a) of the Constitution,1 every person has the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health. Health facilities, for this purpose, are required to ensure their 
hospitals are fully stocked and their medical personnel well trained, in order to provide the 
required level of care to their patients. In Muchoki v AG,2 the court stated that “when a 
hospital accepts a patient for treatment, it must not only use reasonable care and skill to cure 
him of his ailment, but must also provide a safe and secure environment for such treatment.”  
It is therefore necessary to ensure professionalism in this sector by regulating services offered 
by health care providers and also in protecting the rights of the patients, the consumers of the 
health care services. In Kenya, the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board (hereinafter 
referred to as the Board), established under Cap 2533 is the regulatory body for medical and 
dentistry practitioners and has undertaken the obligation of ensuring provision of quality and 
ethical health care through appropriate regulation of training, registration, licensing, 
inspections and professional practice.4  
The Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act5 (henceforth referred to as the Act) is the law that 
governs the Board in carrying out its two-fold function; representing medical practitioners 
and regulating medical practice. 
The Board is composed of; a chairman, appointed by the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of 
Health; The Director of Medical services who is the Registrar; A Deputy Director of Medical 
Services appointed by the Cabinet Secretary; Four medical/dental practitioners nominated by 
the Cabinet Secretary and A representative of each of the universities in Kenya which have 
the power to grant a medical/dental qualification that is registrable under the Act.6 
In the event that a medical practitioner or dentist is convicted of an offence either under The 
Act or under the Penal Code, then The Act elaborately provides for disciplinary proceedings,7 
to be undertaken by the Board and also grants it the freedom to regulate their procedure in the 
																																								 																				
1 Article 43(1)(a), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
2 Muchoki v AG [2004] KLR 518. 
3 The Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act, Cap 253, 2012. 
4 http://medicalboard.co.ke/about-us/mission-vision/.  
5 The Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act, (2012). 
6 Code of Professional Conduct and Discipline, 2012. 
7 Section 20, The Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act, (2012). 
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proceedings.8 Medical malpractice, which is the failure of the medical practitioners in 
exercising reasonable skill and care to treat patients is one of the offences that would warrant 
disciplinary proceedings before the Board. 
This disciplinary role of the Board is undertaken by the Preliminary Inquiry Committee 
(PIC), consisting of 7 members elected from the members of the Board and the Professional 
Conduct Committee (PCC) that is set up on an ad hoc basis upon the recommendation of the 
PIC.   
The procedure for filing a complaint with the Board is that when a complaint is lodged, the 
Board writes to the person against whom the complaint is made, requesting for necessary 
documents such as copy of the patients file, statements of all medical personnel involved in 
the patients care, to be delivered within 7-21 days. Once the required documents are 
provided, the Board forwards the information to the PIC who then picks a specialised person 
from the Board to go through the documents and make a written report. After the written 
report has been done, it is returned to the committee who deliberate on the issue. The 
members thereafter use the information received from the written report and their discussions 
with both parties to make a decision, which is supplied to the Board. The Board after 
receiving the findings of the PIC similarly deliberates on the verdict and thereafter decide 
whether they will ratify the decision or give further directions on it. If the Board finds that the 
case has merit and requires reference to Full Board Tribunal, concerned parties are informed 
in writing and the preparation of the Tribunal begins.9 The tribunal is the full Board 
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and acts as a court in order to determine 
disciplinary matters.10 
Despite this regulatory framework provided, the claims of medical malpractice have been on 
an increase in the country of late, hence the need to ask ourselves, where is the country falling 
short?11 A statistical analysis of complaints brought before the Board for years 2007-2012 
was supplied by Kenya Medical Association; and the analysis, hinging on the frequency of 
																																								 																				
8 Section 20(4), The Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act. 
9  Code of Professional Conduct and Discipline, 2012. 
10 Code of Professional Conduct and Discipline, 2012. 
11 Ndemo B, Our Medical Malpractice Crisis’, July 21 2014. http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/blogs/dot9/ndemo/-
/2274486/2391482/-/2w7q2pz/-/index.html (Accessed on 14/12/2015). 
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complaints, the type of health facility and the category of the complaint clearly shows the 
increasing trend of complaints in the country.12 
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12 Magoha George, ‘Medical Litigation and How to Manage It’, 2013. 
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There are a number of inadequacies of the Act in providing for the Board to regulate medical 
malpractice in the country and the Board in actually carrying out their obligations. The Act on 
one hand grants the Board the freedom to investigate cases of medical malpractice but it is 
silent on the matter of compensation available to the victims. The Board therefore, cannot 
provide for something that it has not been granted the power to provide. 
 
The Board, on the other hand, has the power to revoke the licence of practitioners or dentists 
found guilty of malpractice, yet it is in most cases unwilling to exercise this power. Cases of 
malpractice presented to the Board in the past have often ended with a lenient penalty, a one-
year suspension for the offending doctor and/or a recommendation for retraining or merely a 
warning to the practitioners.  
 
This could, to some extent, be attributed to the conflict of interest present in the double role 
the Board plays. It has been mandated with regulating medical practice and also representing 
medical practitioners thereby causing the suspicion that the Board is more geared towards 
supporting doctors as opposed to protecting the patients. Separating regulatory functions from 
representative bodies in most cases causes the risk of conflict of interest.13 
 
In addition, while exercising their discretion to determine whether they will take up a 
complaint, the Board at times throws out cases before carrying out due diligence. In the 
famous reproductive rights case of M.N.N v AG of Kenya,14 the Board underwent heavy 
criticism for dismissing the claims of M.N.N without explanation and without allowing her to 
present her case. In this particular case, a Kenyan woman’s genitals were mutilated in a 
private hospital without her knowledge or consent and had been turned away by both the 
police and the Board upon raising a complaint.  
 
These are some of the inadequacies present in the operation of the Board and the Act. The 
question to ask then would be, where exactly does the weight of the problem lie? Is it a 
																																								 																				
13 Vries H, Sanderson P, Janta B, Rabinovich L, Archontakis F, Ismail S, Klautzer L, Marjanovic S, Patruni B, 
Puri S, Tiessen J,  International Comparison of Ten Medical Regulatory Systems,  RAND Corporation, 2009. 
14 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘Realising Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights in Kenya: 
A myth or reality?’, 2012  
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problem of the law being insufficient in providing redress for medical malpractice or does the 
fault lie with the Board in being unable to effectively carry out its function. 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
The problem that arises is whether the Kenya Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board is 
efficiently regulating medical malpractice in the country or is the reason for the increasing 
rate of complaints due to the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act that has not sufficiently 
provided for its regulation. This research study seeks to address these questions and assess 
whether the current disciplinary proceedings for medical malpractice provided are efficient 
and where exactly they fall short, if they do. 
1.3 Justification of Study 
This paper aims to contribute to the knowledge gap in the medical-legal field in Kenya, 
specifically medical malpractice that has not been developed extensively.  
1.4 Statement Of Objective 
The overall objective of this research is to assess the efficiency of the disciplinary 
proceedings of medical malpractice in Kenya. 
The specific objectives of the research study will be to determine: 
1.) Whether the current legal framework sufficiently provides for medical malpractice 
regulation and redress. 
2.) Whether the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board is efficiently carrying out its 
mandate of regulating medical malpractice in the country. 
1.5 Research Questions 
1. What is the legal and regulatory framework of medical malpractice regulation in Kenya. 
2. To what extent are those frameworks capable of redressing medical malpractice claims. 
3. Is the current system for complaint and disciplinary proceedings for medical malpractice 
efficient. 
1.6 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this study is that the measures set up for medical malpractice regulation in 
Kenya are inadequate and that the Medical Practitioners Board is not fully carrying out its 
functions as it is in a situation of conflict of interest.  
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1.7 Research Design and Methodology 
This research shall be conducted using both qualitative and limited quantitative approaches. 
Qualitative methods that shall be used will include desktop research. The desktop research 
information procured shall seek to analyse the legal and policy framework of medical 
malpractice regulation in Kenya.  
In conducting limited quantitative research, various medical research centres shall be visited 
in order to acquire more information on the surveys done in the medical field that touch on 
the complaints made. Information shall also be sought from the Board, in order to acquire 
information on the number of cases filed and any other information that can be acquired 
without infringing on the principle of confidentiality. 
An interview shall be conducted with the Kenya Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board 
representatives to gather more information. 
1.8 Limitations 
There is an information gap on medical law in the country thus procuring necessary 
information on medical malpractice will be difficult. 
There is the doctor-patient confidentiality rule that might be broken by seeking information 
on cases of medical malpractice from either doctors or the board hence the uneasiness that 
parties might face on releasing such information.  
Time constraints prompted by the fact that the study is to be done within a short period of 
time.  
1.9 Chapter Summary 
Chapter Two will highlight the theories employed to justify this research study and provide 
the basis for responding to the research questions and fully examine the dissertation. Chapter 
Three will highlight the legal and regulatory framework for medical malpractice regulation in 
the country and the problems that arise therein. Chapter Four will furthermore expound on 
these issues and analyse the efficiency of this regulatory framework, fully tackling the 
research questions. Chapter Five will finally provide a summary of the findings of the study 




CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
The relationship between a patient and a medical practitioner is essentially privileged, 
depending on the patient’s trust in the medical practitioner’s professionalism. Medical 
practitioners should be guided by their responsibility to act in the best interests of their 
patients and to safeguard their rights. Despite the fact that a Board, the Kenya Medical 
Practitioners and Dentists Board, has been set up to regulate instances of medical malpractice, 
due to one reason or another there have been multiple claims of malpractice that have not 
been addressed well. This leads to the assumption that there must be a problem somewhere, 
either in the Board and the way it handles disciplinary proceedings or with the legislation 
enacted that governs medical practitioners. This is, in essence, the fundamental purpose of 
this research study- to determine the efficiency of the disciplinary proceedings of medical 
malpractice.  
The concept of regulation of medical malpractice is what this chapter seeks to demystify. It 
will do so by highlighting and setting out the legal theories that underpin and support the 
research concept. The research study will rely on three theories to further its hypothesis, that 
is the sociological jurisprudence, corrective justice theory and regulatory capture theory.   
Sociological jurisprudence theory will seek to analyse the efficiency of the legal framework 
of medical malpractice and whether it enhances the welfare of its people and caters for the 
social interests of all those at stake. The theory of corrective justice will furthermore lay the 
foundation for determining the efficiency of the disciplinary proceedings and whether the 
Board has made attempts to correct the injustice caused by physicians. The Regulatory 
Capture theory analyses whether the Kenya Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board, formed 
to act in the publics interest, has come to be controlled by the industry they were charged with 





2.2 Sociological Jurisprudence 
This theory analyses the actual effects of the law within society and the influence the social 
phenomena has on the substantive and procedural aspects of law. The foundation of this 
theory is that securing social interests is the proximate end of the law.15 
Roscoe Pound, who was the main proponent of this school of thought, stated that the law has 
always been concerned with social interests and that some certain great social interests have 
determined the growth of law from the beginning.16 He also argues that the law should be 
constructed in such a manner that the various social interests at stake are balanced. According 
to him, there are three categories of legal interests, namely, individual, public and social 
interests. The main aim of sociological jurisprudence is to find a balance between these 
interests.17   
On one hand, interests are classified as individual if they are claims or desires that are directly 
involved in the lives of individuals. These can be sub-categorised as, interests in personality, 
which affect the health, life and reputation of individuals; interests of substance that are 
asserted by individuals in title of an individuals economic existence such as property and 
finally interests in domestic relations such as those between spouses and parents.18 On the 
other hand interests are classified as public if they are claims and desires directly involved in 
a politically organized society and asserted in title of that organization. The final 
classification of interests is social interests, which are, according to Pound, claims or desires 
involved in the social life of a civilized society, what could now be classified as public 
policy.19 Roscoe Pound asserts that when determining what claims to recognize and in what 
limit, the general individual interest behind it should be determined and weighed against the 
social interest.20 
 According to this school of thought, the main aim of any law, whether constitutional 
statutory or case, should be to enhance the welfare of the society. As Roscoe Pound put it, 
																																								 																				
15 Verhelle J C, Roscoe Pound and His Theory of Social Interests, Loyola University Chicago, 1958, 20.  
16 Graber M, Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil Libertarianism, University of 
California Press, 1991.  
17 Nalbandian E, Sociological Jurisprudence: Roscoe Pound’s Discussion on Legal Interests and Jural 
Postulates, 2014. 
18 Pound R, A Survey of Social Interests, Harvard Law Review 57.1, 1943, 1-39.  
19 Pound R, A Survey of Social Interests. 
20 Pound R, A Survey of Social Interests. 
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‘the law must be judged by the result it achieves, not by the niceties of its eternal 
structure...’21 . He called for a ‘jurisprudence of ends’ rather than a ‘jurisprudence of 
conceptions’ through the formulation of laws that sought to balance the social interests of all 
those at stake.22  
One of the main research questions that this study seeks to answer is whether the current 
regulatory framework is efficient in dealing with medical malpractice. This standard of 
efficiency is dependent on whether the legal interests of the three categories mentioned have 
been balanced. Therefore in as much as the regulatory mechanism of medical malpractice has 
been set up, whether or not it has been effective will be largely dependent on the results that 
have come out of it, which is essentially what this study seeks to research on. With medical 
malpractice, there are three interests: that is the interest of the individual who is the victim; 
the interest of the public, which would be the legal institution i.e. the Kenya Medical 
Practitioners and Dentists Board and finally the third interest, which is the State’s duty to the 
citizens to ensure protection of their rights. A well-developed regulatory framework would 
therefore be one that balances the interests of these parties.  
2.3 Theory of Corrective Justice 
 
The theory of corrective justice is derived from the concept of equality with the notion that 
liability rectifies injustice rendered by one to another.23 Aristotle formulated this idea in the 
Nichomachean Ethics Book V, where he focused on instances where one party has committed 
and the other has suffered transactional injustice.24  
The law, according to this theory, should seek to correct the injustice committed by one party 
against another thus restoring equality. Where parties enter into a transaction and one party 
occasions a gain and the other a corresponding loss, corrective justice seeks to rectify the 
injustice by depriving the party of the gain and restoring it to the one who realizes a loss.25 
																																								 																				
21 Verhelle J, Roscoe Pound and His Theory of Social Interests, 32. 
22 James A. Gardner, The Sociological Jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, (Part I), 7 Vill. L. Rev. 1 1961. 
23 Weinrib, Ernest J. Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, The University of Toronto Law Journal, 52.4, 2002, 349-
56. 
24 Aristotle,  Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, Kitchener, Ont: Batoche Books, 1999. 
25 Weinribt E, The gains and losses of corrective justice, Duke Law Journal, 1994, 279. 
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This theory generally governs the law of contract, tort and even criminal law. Aristotle 
however does not distinguish the justice dealing with legal commerce or that dealing with 
criminal matters but merely referred to the former as voluntary justice and the latter as 
involuntary justice.  
By correcting the injustice that one party has inflicted upon another this theory asserts a 
connection between the remedy and the wrong thus fulfilling its rectifying function. Aristotle 
argues that a court when faced with a matter of injustice will not look at it as a morally 
neutral occurrence and then look at what the best course for the future is. Rather it will look 
at the specific matter at hand, as it aims to, in as much as possible, correct the injustice done 
and will thus ensure the remedy responds to the injustice.26 
One of the main functions of medical malpractice law is to deter physicians from shirking in 
their duty to avoid medical accidents. The tort framework of deterrence holds that physician’s 
liability should efficiently increase whenever their productivity in accident avoidance 
increases.27 Therefore the extent of physician liability should vary depending on an increase 
in physician’s productivity, especially by increased technological ability; when the 
opportunity costs of physicians' time increases, or when the cost to physicians of defending 
against malpractice claims decreases.28 
2.4 Regulatory Capture Theory  
 
The regulatory capture theory is the theory associated with George Stigler, a Nobel Laureate 
economist. It is a form of government failure that occurs when a regulatory agency created to 
act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or political concerns of the 
industry it is charged with regulating, or benefits special interest groups dominating the 
industry rather than the public.29 The interests the agency is tasked with protecting are 
ignored in favour of the regulated industry’s interests.  
																																								 																				
26 Weinrib, E., Corrective Justice in a Nutshell. The University of Toronto Law Journal, 2002, 52(4), 349-356. 
27 Olsen R N., The Efficiency of Medical Malpractice Law: Theory and Empirical Evidence, Southwest Missouri 
State University, 2000. 
28 Olsen R N., The Efficiency of Medical Malpractice Law: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 17. 
29 Stigler G, The Theory of Economic Regulation, University of Chicago, 1971, 3.  
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An agency is considered captured when it is unduly influenced by interest groups directly 
affected by its decisions or it shapes its regulations and policies primarily to benefit its 
favoured client groups at the expense of less organized and less influential groups as opposed 
to designing them in accordance with a more inclusive conception of the public interest.30  
The KMPDB, a statutory establishment, is tasked with ensuring provision of quality and 
ethical health care and has the responsibility to act in the public’s interest. One of the 
questions that this research paper seeks to answer is whether the Medical Practitioners Board, 
with its doubled edged role of regulating medical practice and representing medical 
practitioners is more geared towards supporting doctors as opposed to protecting the patients, 
thus becoming a captured agency.  
Stigler furthermore progresses the capture theory from two primary premises:31  
1. The most important asset controlled by the state is the power to coerce. Any group 
that can control how this power is used will profit tremendously.  
2. Since we are self-interested actors, we will seek to get the state's coercive power to 
support our interests. Efforts to do so, however, are costly, thereby benefitting the 
group that has more money. 
With such a scenario occurring, the medical practitioners and dentists interests will always 
win as compared to the public interest. This favoured by the advantage they have of being 
able to deal with collective action problems due to their homogenous nature and the similarity 
and cohesion of their interests. Consumers on the other hand cannot organize themselves for 
collective actions for two major reasons: they lack a homogenous nature as that of their 
counterparts and the costs of doing so are higher than the benefits sought. The public 
therefore remains rationally ignorant and the regulatory body continues favouring the 
industry in spite of the injustices occasioned against the patients.  
2.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to highlight the theories that lay the foundation for this 
research study. It is instrumental in introducing and explaining the existence of the research 
problem, which shall be discussed in the following chapters. The sociological jurisprudence 
theory seeks to determine whether the legal framework is efficient and is catering to the 
																																								 																				
30 US Legal, Captured Agency: Law and Legal Definition. https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/captured-agency/  
31 Stigler G, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 4. 
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social interests of all those at stake. The theory of corrective justice looks at whether the law 
is correcting the injustice that has been inflicted by one party on another and whether the 
correction corresponds to the harm done. The regulatory capture theory furthermore has laid 
the foundation for determining whether the Board, which regulates and represents the medical 
profession, has become a captured agency and is working towards advancing its regulatees’ 
interests as opposed to the public interest.  
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CHAPTER 3: LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
REGULATION 
3.1 Introduction 
The Kenya Medical Association supplied a statistical analysis of complaints brought before 
the Board for the years 2007-2012. The analysis, which focused on the frequency of 
complaints, the type of health facility and the category of the complaint pointed towards an 
increasing trend of complaints of medical malpractice in the country.32 The analysis showed 
that majority of medical malpractice took place in private hospitals with a percentage of 70% 
and the highest type of complaints mostly had to do with gynaecology and obstetric matters 
ranking at 27%.  
The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNHCR) published a report on a public 
inquiry into the violations of sexual and reproductive health rights in Kenya, following a 
FIDA-Kenya and Centre for Reproductive Rights (CRR) about extreme cases of violations of 
women reproductive rights in health facilities. The report found that there was extreme 
medical malpractice especially when it came to female reproductive health.33 There were 
complaints of mistreatment of patients by inebriated practitioners. Women who gave birth 
were also in some cases asked to clean items they soiled after delivery, several women had 
processes done on them without their consent, some of which had horrendous consequences. 
Health professionals also ignored the patients and failed to give them information on risks of 
medical interventions and procedures.34 
There has also been an unprecedented increase in exposure of medical negligence due to the 
increase in media coverage and the general awareness of all Kenyans on their rights to access 
quality care and free access to emergency service following the promulgation of the New 
Constitution.35 
																																								 																				
32 Magoha George, ‘Medical Litigation and How to Manage It’, 2013. 
33 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘Realising Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights in Kenya: 
A myth or reality?’ 2012, 50. 
34 Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, ‘Realising Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights in Kenya: 
A myth or reality?’ 52. 
35 Mwaura N, Rogo K, Wafula F, Focusing on Patient Safety and Quality of Care: Preventing Medical 
Malpractice and Negligence in Kenya, The World Bank, 2016. Available at 
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This Chapter seeks to explore the overall scheme for medical malpractice liability regulation 
in the country. It will begin with a brief overview of the jurisdiction of the Medical 
Practitioners and Dentists Board and then discuss the legal and regulatory system currently in 
place. This section will raise the challenges facing medical malpractice in the country which 
shall be expounded on in the next chapter.  
3.2 Jurisdiction and Standard of Proof 
Justice Ringera in K & K Amman Limited vs. Mount Kenya Game Ranch Ltd. & 3 Others 
stated that in order to prove professional negligence against a professional person, evidence 
has to be produced showing that the professional did not conduct himself with the 
competence, diligence and skill expected of an ordinary professional in his field or must 
persuade the Court that the acts or omissions complained of were manifestly or patently 
dangerous.36  
Section 20 of the Medical Practitioners and Dentist’s Act stipulates the conduct that can raise 
disciplinary issues as being infamous or disgraceful conduct in a professional respect.37 
Infamous Conduct in a Professional Respect was defined by Lord Justice Lopes as an act 
committed by a medical man in the pursuit of his professional duties that would be 
reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good 
repute and competence.38 Lord Justice Scrutton further defined it as serious misconduct 
judged according to the rules, whether written or unwritten that govern the profession.39 
Rule 5(1) of the Medical Practitioners and Dentists (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Procedure) 
Rules as well as the Code of Professional Conduct and Discipline take the latter definition.40 
While it has been referred to over the years, serious professional misconduct is not statutorily 
described or capable of being given a precise description.41 As Lord Wright stated in General 
Medical Council v Spackman, the precise meaning and scope of what constitutes infamous 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
http://blogs.worldbank.org/health/focusing-patient-safety-and-quality-care-preventing-medical-malpractice-and-
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36 K & K Amman Limited vs. Mount Kenya Game Ranch Ltd. & 3 Others Nairobi (Milimani) HCCC 6076 of 
1993. 
37 Section 20(1), Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act, 2012. 
38 Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Regulation [1894]1 QB 750. 
39 General Medical Council, Professional Conduct and Discipline:Fitness To Practice. London: GMC, 1987.  
40 Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board, The Code of Professional Conduct and Discipline, 20. 
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conduct in any professional respect is left to the council. It has to decide whether infamous 
conduct has been made to its satisfaction, in any professional respect and to decide what 
standards to apply.42  
However in Munene v Republic the court held that according to Section 23 (1) of the earlier 
Act (which is equivalent to Section 20 of the current Act) the Board had no jurisdiction to 
consider charges of infamous or disgraceful conduct based on allegations of facts, which 
constituted criminal offence.43 It was argued that there were certain facts that bordered the 
line of infamous or disgraceful conduct and criminal offence and the Board could therefore 
not be barred from treating them as infamous or disgraceful conduct without waiting for the 
verdict of the court of law. The court however held that the Board had the jurisdiction to look 
into a matter with criminal elements only if it resulted in a conviction in a court of law and 
since there was no proof of conviction, the Board was incompetent in dealing with the 
offences in any event.  
The standard of proof for ‘serious professional misconduct’ has generally been held to be 
higher than that of civil law matters but slightly lower than that of criminal law matters, on a 
preponderance of evidence. In Pope John Paul’s Hospital & Another vs. Baby Kasozi,44 the 
East African Court of Appeal held: ‘To the extent of not confusing negligence with 
misadventure, clear proof of negligence is necessary in cases involving medical men, but it 
cannot be accepted that the burden of proving such negligence is higher than in ordinary 
cases. The burden is to prove that the damage was caused by negligence and was not a 
question of misadventure, and that burden must be discharged on a preponderance of 
evidence...’ 
In the Kenyan context however, the exact standard of proof with regard to Inquiries on 
medical malpractice has not been well established. While the courts have attempted to clarify 
this, their holdings keep shifting between that of civil law jurisdiction with the standard of 
proof being a balance of probabilities and quasi criminal law jurisdiction with the standard of 
proof being almost beyond reasonable doubt or on a ‘preponderance of evidence’.  
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In both J.O.O. & 2 others v Praxades P Mandu Okutoyi & 2 others45 and Atsango Chesoni v 
David Mortons Silverstein,46 the jurisdiction of the Board was established to be that of quasi-
criminal jurisdiction. However the standard of proof applied in both cases were different. In 
the appeal case of Atsango Chesoni v David Mortons Silverstein, the appellant, during the 
Inquiry before the Board was tasked with proving the quasi-criminal charges nearly beyond 
reasonable doubt, which he failed and upon appeal, the Court upheld the Board’s decision.47 
While in J.O.O. & 2 others, the standard of proof the Board had adopted which was that of 
strict responsibility or the preponderance of evidence, was upheld by the Court. On the other 
hand, Justice Rawal, in the J.O.O case stated that the standard of proof before the Board was 
different from the standard of proof that was within the ambit of the Court, which was on a 
balance of probability.  
This uncertainty concerning the exact standard of proof that plaintiffs would need to prove 
their case needs to be rectified. ‘Beyond reasonable doubt’ is the highest standard of proof 
reserved for criminal charges and a ‘balance of probabilities’ for civil matters is on the other 
end of the spectrum. Somewhere in between is ‘preponderance of the evidence’ which is the 
amount of evidence sufficient to make a contested fact more likely true than not. The burden 
of proof in medical liability cases across the globe has generally been either a balance of 
probabilities for instance in the UK or on a preponderance of evidence,48 therefore a fixed 
standard of proof needs to be established by the Kenyan courts that would apply to 
determinations of both the Board and the Court. Otherwise having a lower standard of proof 
in Courts than in the Board will serve as a hindrance to victims raising their complaints in the 
Board.  
3.3 Legal and Regulatory Framework of Medical Malpractice 
 
Any legal, policy or administrative framework must always measure up to the Constitutional 
benchmark. The number of provisions on the right to and protection of health have greatly 
increased in the new Constitution.  
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Article 43 (1) (a) and (2) of the Constitution guarantees every person the highest attainable 
standard of health inclusive of health care services, maternal and reproductive health care and 
the right to emergency medical treatment.49  
Article 46 (1) (a), (c) and (d) of the Constitution provide for a right to goods and services of 
reasonable quality,50 to the protection of their health, safety, and economic interests,51 and to 
be compensated for loss or injury arising from defects in goods and services.52 
Article 21 as read together with Article 56 (e) of the Constitution ensures that the vulnerable 
groups, marginalized groups and minorities (including but not limited to the illiterate, the 
medically incapacitated, the uneducated and uninformed) should have reasonable access to 
health care services. Article 53 (1)(c) of the Constitution protects the right of the child to 
basic nutrition, shelter and health care.53  
The Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act read together with Medical Practitioners and 
Dentists (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Procedure) Rules confer disciplinary powers upon the 
Board. Section 4 of the Act establishes the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board whose 
functions among others is discipline. They are expected to conduct preliminary inquiries on 
professional conduct and medical malpractice and hold and conduct tribunal meetings and 
inquiries into the health and fitness of practitioners.  
Disciplinary cases generally come before the Board in two ways: One arises from the 
conviction of a doctor or dentist in regular courts or tribunals.54 A charge of professional 
misconduct can be brought against a practitioner with respect to any conduct before the courts 
or tribunals for which he is placed on probation, acquitted or is discharged. Even if the 
criminal offence of the practitioner did not involve professional misconduct, a conviction 
itself grants the Board jurisdiction. A conviction of a practitioner before the court of law will 
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affect his/her fitness to practice thereafter.55 The second is where a practitioner is alleged to 
have acted in a manner that amounts to serious professional misconduct.56 
This disciplinary role of the Board is undertaken by the Preliminary Inquiry Committee 
(PIC), consisting of 7 members elected from the members of the Board,57 the Professional 
Conduct Committee (PCC) that is set up on an ad hoc basis upon the recommendation of the 
PIC;58 and the full Board exercising judicial or quasi functions to determine disciplinary 
matters is known as a Tribunal. 
The rules governing disciplinary proceedings seem to point towards a perceived protection of 
the profession. Rule 7, in discussing the procedures related to conduct, provides multiple 
leeway for the practitioner to escape a conviction. For instance, it states that when a 
complaint is raised and evidence adduced, the practitioner can make two submissions: that no 
sufficient evidence has been adduced upon which the Board could find that the facts alleged 
have been proved and that the facts of which evidence has been adduced are insufficient to 
support a finding of infamous or disgraceful conduct in a professional respect.59 If those 
submissions are made then the Board shall determine whether or not to uphold that 
submission and if they do uphold it then the Chairman shall announce that the medical 
practitioner or dentist is not guilty of infamous or disgraceful conduct in a professional 
respect.60 Not once in the entire Rule 7 is there mention of a finding of the practitioner being 
guilty and the consequences of such, yet a finding of the practitioner being not guilty of 
infamous or disgraceful conduct has been mentioned a total of three times.  
Upon completion of the disciplinary proceedings, the sanctions placed differ, depending on 
the level of authority the matter has come before. If it was decided at the Preliminary Inquiry 
Committee or Professional Conduct Committee and the doctor has been found guilty of 
professional misconduct or is found to have breached the applicable law then the Committees 
shall by simple majority decide whether the matter will be further referred to the Tribunal or 
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decide on one of the following courses:-61 Admonish the doctor, dentist or the institution for 
the conduct, done by sending warning letters to the concerned practitioner or institution; 
Order payment of costs for the Committee’s sitting payable by the Practitioner or Institution 
on terms that are deemed just and fit under the circumstances; Levy reasonable costs of the 
proceedings from parties; Order the medical practitioner to undergo continuous professional 
development for a maximum of up to 50 points; Suspend the license of the medical institution 
for up to six months; Order the closing of the Institution until compliance with the 
requirements of operation license has been met and Record and adopt a mediation agreement 
or compromise between the complainant and the practitioner or the institution, on the terms 
that parties have agreed upon and thereafter inform the chairman. 
Once an inquiry has been completed before the Tribunal and the practitioner found culpable 
of a criminal offence or of serious misconduct in a professional respect, the courses the 
Tribunal can take are similar to those afforded to the PIC with the following additional 
penalties such as Placing the practitioner on probation for a period not exceeding six months- 
the decision shall be by a simple majority vote; Directing suspension of doctors or dentist’s 
registration or license for a period not exceeding twelve months or directing removal from the 
register, which will remain effective indefinitely until the doctor or practitioners makes a 
successful application for restoration of his/her name in the register. In accordance with the 
Act, an order for suspension or removal from register of a practitioners name can only be 
made by a two-thirds majority vote of the Board Members. 
While there is a great range of punishments available to the Board, in practice, they tend to 
grant lenient sanctions to the practitioners. Even where the Board finds the practitioner guilty, 
they at times let them go with a slap on the wrist such as suspension for a couple of months or 
ordering the practitioner to undergo continuous professional development for a maximum of 
up to 50 points or even merely admonishing the practitioner.62 Such penalties cannot measure 
up to the consequences or effects the medical malpractice has had on the victim, who will 
most likely have to live with it for life.  
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Evidence also shows that the Board is more tilted towards protecting doctors even where the 
doctor was negligent.63 In some instances they will find in favour of the practitioner despite 
evidence of their guilt as they did in the case of George Moga v Nairobi Women’s Hospital & 
3 Others.64 Upon appeal of the Boards decision, the Court, in this matter, found that the 
Board was contradictory in the findings and recommendations of their report as their findings 
clearly showed that the two doctors had failed to exercise the duty of care expected of a 
doctor while the recommendations found that they were not negligent in the management of 
the deceased. The facts of the case were that the deceased was referred to the Nairobi 
Women’s Hospital to be attended to but was instead instructed by Dr. Wahome to continue 
previous wrong medications ordered by a doctor from Kenyatta National Hospital. The 
deceased’s condition worsened so she returned the following day for further examination and 
treatment. She was however not treated but casually attended to by Dr. Kigondu who relied 
on the wrong diagnosis of depression and admitted her, awaiting Dr. Mucheru’s arrival from 
Dadaab. The deceased continued to complain of chest pain and inability to breath and when 
Dr. Mucheru finally arrived, her condition had already deteriorated. The doctor however 
relied on the same initial diagnosis of depression even after noting that the deceased’s 
condition was worsening rather than improving. She later recommended that a physician be 
called to examine the deceased but left before ensuring it was done. No physician examined 
the deceased as recommended and she later died that same day. When a post mortem was 
conducted on the deceased’s body, the cause of death was found to be acute colpulmonale 
secondary to Pulmonary Thrombo-embolism. The matter was taken before the Board. The 
findings of the Board were that, Dr. Wahome had failed to properly asses the patient hence he 
did not recognise how seriously ill the patient was; that Dr. Mucheru had failed to make 
arrangements for the patient to be seen while away in Dadaab and when she did see her she 
did not asses the patient’s condition and finally that Dr. Kigondu was asked to help with 
sustaining only. The recommendations on the other hand stated that the cause of death was 
thrombo-embolism, which cannot be detected and that the doctors were not negligent. These 
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inconsistent findings and recommendations points out the Boards aim in protecting their 
peers, the medical practitioners, even in instances where evidence shows their guilt. 
What should also be noted is that the Act does not afford the Board the power to grant 
compensation to victims even after a favourable finding, there is absolutely no mention of 
remedies that are available to the victims. The only option the victims have is to seek 
compensation from the Courts, which, being an expensive and lengthy process, discourages 
majority of Kenyans. The Act’s predisposition to merely punish the practitioners found guilty 
of wrongdoing and totally ignore ways on how to restore and repair the harm caused by the 
practitioner points towards a heavy reliance on retributive justice. This shall be discussed 
further in the next chapter, however in essence, this form of justice shifts focus off the victim 
and the protection of their right to seek compensation for loss or injury arising from defects in 
goods or services granted by Article 46 of the Constitution.65 
While appeals to the Board’s decision can be made at the High Court within 30 days, this 
does not afford the victim a chance to access justice either. Lawyers say that medical 
negligence cases gather dust in court because expert witnesses are unwilling to testify against 
doctors.66 The cases are eventually dropped due to lack of evidence thereby costing victims 
their right to justice under the Constitution.  
3.4 Conclusion 
Having identified the weaknesses in legal and regulatory framework of medical malpractice 
in the country, the next chapter will now fully analyse these issues on the basis of the research 
questions and the theoretical framework. It will look at the local context and international 
practices to highlight the gaps that are in need of reform.  
  
																																								 																				
65 Article 46(1)(d), Constitution of Kenya. 
66 Ayodo H, Why courts dismiss medical negligence cases, Law Society of Kenya, Available at 
http://www.lsk.or.ke/index.php/component/content/article/1-latest-news/511-why-courts-dismiss-medical-
negligence-cases Accessed on 28th November 2016.  
	 23	
CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Introduction 
There have been numerous reports of increasing complaints of medical malpractice in the 
country with doctors easily getting away without sanctions or sufficient punishment.67 With 
992 cases lodged with the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board since 1977, 
approximately 10 doctors only have been found guilty of medical negligence.68  
Multiple cases of negligence that have garnered the public’s attention have led to serious 
consequences. In one case a woman had a C-section performed by a doctor during which an 
abdominal pack was accidentally forgotten in the abdomen. Upon returning a week later with 
complaints of abdominal pains, she was told that it would be an additional charge to remove 
the pack; she however did not have enough money for that. She thereafter died of the 
complications caused by the pack in her abdomen.69 In another case a doctor authorized a 
nurse to conduct an unnecessary caesarean on a mother, which resulted in both her and her 
baby’s death yet the doctor was given only four months suspension and there was no legal 
repercussion for his practice.70  
The fiduciary duty and high standard of care expected of the medical profession has greatly 
deteriorated in Kenya over the years, with many patients seriously being harmed by the 
profession. It is reported that about 20% of all hospital patients die or are harmed of medical 
malpractice in Kenya, and according to a research done by medical lawyers and independent 
pathologists, 3 out of 10 patients get the wrong diagnosis in hospitals.71 
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The Court surmised as much in Renison Mukhwana & another v Medical Practitioners And 
Dentists Board, 
‘It cannot have escaped the Boards attention that the kind of medical services 
presently given to the Kenyan public has deteriorated to the lowest possible 
standards. In my view and with great respect to the Board, the Board can do more to 
improve the standard of professional medical service to the people. The Medical 
Board need not wait until a case such as this arises before it can stamp its supervisory 
authority and mandate on doctors and health institutions.’72 
This chapter seeks to analyse the challenges facing medical malpractice regulation in the 
country. They will be addressed in two categories: - those that are caused by the inadequacies 
of the law and those contributed by the inefficiency of the Board. While there may be an 
overlap between the factors contributing to the sad state of medical profession regulation, this 
Chapter will address them individually in order to decipher where the weight of the problem 
lies.  
4.2 Inadequacy of The Law  
Medical ethics is supposed to play a big role in promoting quality healthcare therefore poorly 
developed malpractice laws will drastically compromise these services. It is very vital for 
laws to be constructed in a manner that enhances the welfare of its people and caters to the 
social interest of all those at stake. There are a number of challenges in the law that have 
inhibited successful regulation of malpractice, which this section will elaborate on. 
4.2.1 Focus on Retributive as Opposed to Restorative Justice.  
One challenge is that the general construction of the Kenya Medical Practitioners and 
Dentists Act points towards a retributive justice stance as opposed to restorative justice, 
which is more important in this context. The penalties provided in the Medical Practitioners 
and Dentists (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Procedure) Rules are merely limited to punishing 
the practitioners such as suspension, ordering closure of institutions and admonishing doctors; 
and there is no mention of any form of reparation to be accorded to the victims.73 While both 
forms of justice are desirous of vindicating the wrongful action by punishing the offender, 
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restorative justice seeks to do this by acknowledging the needs of the victim and the 
community at large combined with an effort to encourage offenders to take responsibility 
while retributive justice seeks to punish the offenders by imposing pain.74  
The Act should be more concerned with justice and restoring the balance rather than merely 
punishing the offender. Upon completion of an inquiry by the Board, the only legal orders 
that are given are to do with the guilty practitioner alone. There are no forms of remedy 
available to the victims even as little as an apology to the patient. Research has it that upon a 
medical error, victims want an apology from the practitioner, admitting they made a mistake; 
practitioners however fear they will be admitting liability.75  
Restorative justice presents a model that addresses medical malpractice while looking at the 
needs of patients, practitioners and the community at large.76 This does not however mean 
that the needs of the other players in the medical field ought to be disregarded, it just 
emphasizes on a healing-centred framework that addresses the needs of the patients and 
community, especially the physician-patient care relationship. 77  Most of the medical 
malpractice reforms look at the needs of the practitioners, the hospitals and the insurance 
companies and this neglects the patients and communities grievances and their need to heal.  
4.2.2 Legal Remedies 
Under the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act, the Board is not given the power to grant 
compensation to affected victims even where the practitioner has been found culpable. The 
disciplinary process for medical malpractice is a two-step process, when a victim complains 
to the Board, it is their duty to investigate and determine whether the practitioner accused is 
guilty or innocent.78 If the practitioner is found culpable then they will proceed to determine 
the punishment that shall be meted out to him/her. There is no mention whatsoever of the 
remedies that are available to the complainants, if the complaint is successful. In order to get 
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compensation, the victim has to file a medical negligence suit in Court, which is an expensive 
and lengthy process that discourages majority of Kenyans.  
In P.M.N v Kenyatta National Hospital & 6 others, the plaintiff had first filed his complaint 
at the Medical Practitioners & Dentists Board but it was dismissed on the grounds that the 
Board had no power to make monetary awards. He therefore took it before the Court in order 
to be granted compensation.79 What raised concerns in this case was that the Board dismissed 
the complaint because they had no power to grant awards and according to the submissions 
of the 1st Defendant in this court matter, the plaintiff had submitted the complaint before the 
wrong forum, the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board, which can only give 
recommendations but not grant damages. This raises multiple questions, is the fact that the 
Board cannot grant compensation reason enough to dismiss a legitimate case? If the Board 
cannot grant compensation then has it failed in its role and purpose thereby rendering it a 
wrong forum for bringing complaints?  
The right to compensation for loss or injury arising from defects in goods or services is a 
Constitutionally granted right under Article 46(d), which governs consumer’s rights.80 Any 
legal, policy or administrative framework must always strive to meet the constitutional 
benchmark. The Act’s silence and absolute disregard for this matter, therefore, questions 
whether it is indeed capable of protecting the rights of the public and efficiently regulating 
medical malpractice.  
Many occurrences of medical malpractice are not brought before the Court due to the general 
lack of awareness of the public and also because of the inability of the Board to grant 
compensation.81 In most instances, complainants that institute matters before the Board, drop 
the case upon discovery of the incapacity of the Board to grant compensation or even 
ordering specific performance of the accused doctor in correcting the wrong committed.82  
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Majority of Kenyans are unable to institute proceedings before the High Court due to 
monetary concerns and also the inability to get representation, the few that do however end 
up spending a long time in Court and spend a lot of money with a large chunk being set aside 
for the lawyer representing them. All this coupled with the fact that there is no guarantee that 
the Court will find in their favour serves as a great hindrance. 
As discussed earlier, the Act’s reliance solely on retributive justice as opposed to restorative 
justice shifts the focus from the victims and does not grant them a chance to access justice 
sufficiently. This research paper does not however deny that punishing the doctors for their 
negligence serves to control medical malpractice. While it may largely serve that purpose, 
acknowledging the need for the victims to be rehabilitated and to, as much as is possible, 
grant them any form of legal remedies would address the needs of the aggrieved complainant.  
What has also prevented the victims from being granted compensation is that the Board’s 
inquiry has been considered as being a quasi-criminal process while the Court has been 
categorised as a civil law jurisdiction.  In the case of J.O.O. & 2 others v Praxades P Mandu 
Okutoyi & 2 others, the Court held that the scope and jurisdiction of the Board cannot be 
assimilated with the Industrial Tribunal or other similar Tribunals, which hear and determine 
the civil claims of the party.83 Similarly, in Atsango Chesoni v David Mortons Silverstein, the 
High Court found that the standard of proof of complaints brought before the Board is that of 
professional misconduct strictly and not on a balance of probability.84 This essentially means 
that the inquiry is of a criminal nature and should therefore not be regarded as a civil matter. 
All in all, legal remedies are exercised in civil law jurisdictions therefore looking at 
malpractice matters as being of a criminal nature bars victims from being granted judicial 
relief.  
4.3 Inefficiency of The Board 
This section will now tackle ways in which the Board has failed to effectively regulate 
medical malpractice. Transparency International, while conducting a Health Integrity Study 
in Kenya, found that regulatory bodies have become lax in enforcing rules, regulations and 
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guidelines governing the quality of healthcare services in the Kenya.85 The Kenya Health 
Sector Integrity Study Report observed that these bodies tend to protect the medical 
professionals instead of focusing on the healthcare issues that have been perpetrated. In most 
instances, Kenyans find out about cases that have garnered little or no action from the 
regulatory authorities from the media. This laxity of the regulatory bodies has led to 
unscrupulous medical professionals violating many health care standards through the existing 
loopholes without the fear of penal consequences.86 
4.3.1 Self-Regulation 
A major factor that has contributed to the laxity of the Medical Practitioners and Dentists 
Board in carrying out disciplinary proceedings is the fact that there is substantial self-
regulation, which has been proven to be weak and ineffective.87 While self-regulation may be 
advantageous, given the small amount of resources required to administer it, the greater 
disadvantage of lack of effectiveness and transparency far surpasses it. The close relationship 
between the regulatory body, the Board, and the ones being regulated, the practitioners, may 
jeopardize the implementation of regulation, as the regulator may be protective of or can 
easily be manipulated by the regulatees; a phenomenon referred to as regulatory capture.88 
Self-regulation in the medical field began well beyond the 19th century, where societies, in the 
mid-1850’s delegated their traditional powers such as regulation to the physicians.89 The 
rationale for this was that the medical field required extensive and complex knowledge and 
skill and could thus not be handled by non-professionals. It was thought that the medical 
profession could be trusted to carry this task out successfully however in the 20th Century 
many social scientists found that the profession had abused this privileged status and their 
regulation was thoroughly flawed.90 They were criticized for applying weak, variable and 
inconsistent standards, for using collegiality as a protection for physicians’ wrongdoing and 
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for not exhibiting transparency and involvement of the public in regulatory procedures. All in 
all the profession was accused of lacking accountability and the need for the public’s 
involvement was emphasized.91 
Self-regulation in the medical profession is a complex task that requires many layers of 
oversight to ensure that practicing professionals are competent enough.92 For this to be 
achieved then the profession and its regulatory role must ensure that those in practice 
maintain their competence,93 must take appropriate action once a problem with an individual 
practitioner has been identified,94 and should sufficiently regulate conflicts of interest.95  
Many developing countries tend to focus more on licensing and regulating entry into the 
medical profession rather than inspecting the medical professionals performance, which 
thereby gives leeway to these professionals to escape effective regulation.96  
The Kenya Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board fails to fulfil this role of self-regulation 
by failing to ensure competence of the professionals, evidenced by the large rate of ‘fake 
doctors’ taking over many hospitals in the country,97 by failing to take up certain complaints 
that come up before them and by placing lenient penalties for doctors in cases that have even 
caused death.98 
The conflict of interest present in the double role that the Board plays, which is representing 
medical practitioners and also regulating medical practice has also raised suspicion that the 
Board is more geared towards supporting doctors as opposed to protecting the patients.99 For 
instance in the Kenyan case of George Moga v Nairobi Women’s Hospital & 3 Others, 
discussed earlier, the Court found that the Board was contradictory in the findings and 
recommendations of their report, as their findings clearly showed that the two doctors had 
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failed to exercise the duty of care expected of a doctor while the recommendations found that 
they were not negligent in the management of the deceased.100  
Devolving regulatory functions to representative bodies almost always causes the risk of 
conflict of interest.101 Countries such as South Africa and Nigeria have different bodies 
tackling regulatory functions and representative functions. This phenomenon of conflict of 
interest also occurs in more developed countries, for instance, documentary, resources and 
efforts by the Spanish Provincial Colleges of Doctors reveals a heavy inclination towards 
supporting doctors instead of protecting patients.102 
A company of equals, as defined by Barber, when applying it to the medical field, is a social 
group in which each permanent member in the community of medical practitioners is roughly 
equal in authority, self-directing and self-disciplined, pursuing the goal of ensuring highest 
quality care to patients under the guidance of the medical morality he has learned from his 
colleagues and which he shares with them. The sources of purpose and authority are in his 
own conscience and in his respect for the moral judgments of his peers. If his own con-
science is not strong enough, the disapproval of others will control him or will lead to his 
exclusion from the brotherhood.103 
In this ‘company of equals’, physicians expect mutual trust from each other and will therefore 
operate with the belief that no one should be checking up on them and will avoid giving the 
impression that they are also checking up on others. Therefore even if a particular physician 
is not practicing the required standard of care, any peer that notices this will not say anything 
to the requisite authority. This avoidance of investigation limits the flow of information that 
is necessary for the success of a system of control.104 Freidson and Rhea, in their Article, 
Processes Of Control In A Company Of Equals, also argue that this system of control is 
neither hierarchical nor collective; it operates like a free market where private individuals 
exercise control where their personal interests are involved.105 
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The self-regulation of the medical profession in the UK is a perfect example of the failure of 
peer sanction. The collegial model of self-regulation managed to survive for 150 years before 
it was brought down by multiple scandals involving ‘bad apple’ doctors.106 Some of the 
shocking scandals included a doctor, one Mr Harold Shipman, being convicted of 15 charges 
of murder, a gynaecologist Clifford Ayling convicted in 2000 of 12 counts of indecent assault 
on women he had treated as a GP and gynaecologist, and two surgeons operating with 
substandard practice resulted in the deaths of around 30 children. Despite these scandals, the 
GMC (General Medical Council), the regulatory body of medical practitioners, did not 
address the matters.  
This was due to the collegium’s formal systems for addressing malpractice, which were weak 
and ineffective. They instead operated as a form of institutional silencing, seeking to protect 
their peers by subjecting the doctors to quiet chats. According to Inquiries conducted 
following the increased number of scandals,107 the GMC had failed to successfully regulate 
their profession in many ways. First and foremost they made it difficult for patients to make 
formal complaints against doctors during the occurrences of these scandals; they also 
discouraged doctors from making complaints against each other where there was concern 
regarding a doctor’s operation. They also set a high threshold for the GMC’s intervention in 
cases by confining their remit to cases of serious professional misconduct only.108 
Following these scandals, the self-regulation era of the medical profession came to an end; 
powers of setting standards, monitoring practice, and managing defaults among others were 
relocated to outside the profession. 109  State-backed supervision with the powers of 
intervention was also established in the form of the Council for Healthcare Regulatory 
Excellence, in 2003. The long tradition of doctors occupying a majority of positions on the 
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GMC as well as controlling the membership of the Council also ended as members were 
appointed independently.  
The Nigerian and the South African system have also made attempts to reduce the occurrence 
of conflict of interest by separating the regulatory function and representative function of the 
medical profession, as mentioned earlier.110  
The Board has also in some instances breached the law and its own rules to unprocedurally 
dismiss complaints of victims without granting them a right to be heard. In the famous 
reproductive rights case of M.N.N v AG of Kenya,111 the Board underwent heavy criticism for 
dismissing the claims of M.N.N without explanation and without allowing her to present her 
case. In this particular matter, a doctor in a private hospital, mutilated the genitals of a 
Kenyan woman, without her knowledge or consent. Both the board and the police turned her 
away without giving her a chance to present her case. In addition, Republic v Kenya Medical 
Practitioners and Dentists Board and 2 others,112 the court observed that for the Committee 
to fully discharge its mandate, it must look at the whole matter attentively, carefully, think or 
deliberate upon it before reaching a conclusion. The Court was not satisfied that the Board 
had conducted itself in a manner that met the criteria set out in Article 47 of the Constitution 
with respect to procedural fairness and therefore quashed its decision. Concerning this it 
stated: 
“An administrative action cannot be said to be procedurally fair when the process of 
arriving at it is shrouded in mystery. Further an administrative action cannot be said to 
be procedurally fair where a decision is arrived at based on other issues which were not 
the subject of investigation by the Tribunal unless the charges are amended and a proper 
opportunity given to the party charged to respond thereto.”113 
Another challenge strongly tied to self-regulation, is that there is no transparency in the 
institution. While the Board may in most cases not be willing to take up matters due to the 
‘overriding’ need to protect their own self interests and their peers, they fail to share 
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information upon completion of their investigations therefore making it hard for the public to 
know whether they are carrying out their mandate successfully. 
There have been instances where the Board has not publicized cases of medical malpractice 
for fear of shaming the doctor or damaging their reputation.114 The greater question to ask 
when dealing with transparency is how transparent the board should be in their investigations 
of medical malpractice in the country in order to achieve a balance between conflicting 
principles of professional privacy and public transparency. The Board deals with medical 
malpractice cases that are central to the doctor-patient relationship, which is essentially 
privileged and confidential information but also has a fiduciary duty towards the public that is 
vulnerable and reliant on them. Given the public’s lack of awareness and general information 
concerning the Board and their rights to lodge complaints, it is very necessary for the board to 
release its findings if only to reassure them that their right to health is protected.  
4.3.2 Scarcity Of Skilled Medical Practitioners 
The general theory of self-regulation is however not the only factor contributing to the 
laissez-faire attitude of the Board. Nathan Cortez in his article, A Medical Malpractice Model 
For Developing Countries, while looking at medical malpractice regulation highlights the 
factors that affect developing countries. 115 One factor that the author brings out is that 
developing countries have a scarcity of professional doctors thereby causing a monopolistic 
atmosphere, which eventually presents the health care professionals with an opportunity to 
avert meaningful external regulation and accountability. He argues that many of these 
developing countries educate medical practitioners and nurses locally only to watch them 
leave the country and take their skills to more developed countries such as Australia and the 
UK. This creates a shortage in the developing country, or what is referred to as brain drain, 
hence the need for the regulatory authorities to protect the little skill and expertise possessed 
by the doctors locally.  
While it may seem that the effects of brain drain in countries cannot possibly be drastic, a 
research study done in the year 2006 analyzing the cost of health professionals’ brain drain in 
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Kenya clarifies this misguided notion.116 The objectives of the study were to estimate the 
opportunity cost of emigration of Kenyan doctors to the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
United States of America (USA); to estimate the opportunity cost of emigration of nurses to 
seven OECD countries (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal, UK, and USA); and to 
describe other losses from brain drain. The key findings were:- 
The total cost of educating a single medical doctor from primary school to university was US$ 65,997. 
On average, for every doctor that emigrated, a country lost about:  
i. US$ 517,931, assuming a 6.65% interest rate;  
ii. US$ 314,472, assuming an interest rate of 5%; and 
iii.  US$ 6,902,125, assuming an interest rate of 15.64%. 
In addition, the total cost of educating one nurse from primary level to college of health sciences was 
US$ 43,180 and averagely every time a nurse emigrated, the country lost about:  
i. US$ 338,868, assuming a 6.65% interest rate;  
ii. US$ 205,750, assuming an interest rate of 5%; and  
iii. US$ 4,515,869, assuming an interest rate of 15%. 
The application of an interest rate of 15.64% instead of 6.65% increased the economic losses 
resulting from emigration of a doctor and a nurse by 13-fold. 
Financial losses aside, the brain drain of medical personnel leaves only a few skilled ones in 
the country, which causes the increasing need for the Board to retain and protect them. This 
also raises a desperate need for more doctors in regions, especially the rural ones, thereby 
resulting in insufficient checks on backgrounds of applicants or whether they have any 
medical training at all.117 Quite a number of people have taken advantage of the inadequacy 
of skilled practitioners in the country and are masquerading as ‘doctors’ in unregulated 
hospitals. These quack doctors are perpetrating the occurrences of medical malpractice thus 
worsening the already dire state. According to a research conducted by the Kenya Medical 
Practitioners Pharmacists and Dentists Union, about 90% of Kenyan clinics are run by 
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unqualified personnel.118 Only recently, a ‘doctor’ from Meteitei Sub-County Hospital in 
Nandi County, Ronald Kiprotich Melly, was taken to Court for practising medicine without 
qualifications and possible forgery of documents. He was never a student at the University 
and yet had practiced for quite a number of years without detection.119 The Board only 
launched investigations after Mr. Melly presented himself at the Board offices seeking 
permanent registration though he had never been to university, graduated or been properly 
licensed to practise medicine. 
In summary, the decrease in skilled practitioners in the country leads to a high intake of 
doctors despite their level of skill and expertise, which thereby increases the complaints of 
medical malpractice.  
4.4 Conclusion 
Taking all this into consideration, it is not correct to attribute the rise of litigation and 
complaints of medical malpractice sorely on the actual increase of medical negligence; the 
increasing access to information, accountability and consumer awareness, a result of greater 
actualization of constitutional rights, has largely contributed to it also. 
The increasing litigation of medical malpractice has however also led to defensive 
medicine,120 which is the practice of recommending treatment that is not necessarily the best 
option for the patient but is the best way for the doctor to protect himself from liability in the 
event of a bad occurrence.121 Doctors order tests, follow procedures that are not necessary, all 
in a bid to protect themselves from future liability.122 This only increases the cost of health 
care, is a waste of resources set aside for health care and can expose the patients to 
unnecessary risk.  
																																								 																				
118 Fleming N, Kenya: Fake Doctors Run Kenya's Unregulated Hospitals, All Africa News, 2015. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201509160217.html   
119 Quack Doctor Was Never a Medicine Student at The University, Daily Nation, 2016, 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/UoN-denies-quack-doctor-was-its-medical-student/1056-3461036-i41gmjz/ 
Accessed at 22nd November 2016.  
120 Magoha George, ‘Medical Litigation and How to Manage It’, Kenya Medical Association, 2013. 
121 Studdert DM, Mello MM, Sage WM, Defensive medicine among high risk specialist physicians in a volatile 
malpractice environment. The Journal of American Medical Association. 2005, 2609. 
122 Magoha George, ‘Medical Litigation and How to Manage It’, 27. 
	 36	
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will highlight the findings, recommendations and conclusions of the study. This 
research study was undertaken with the intention of determining whether the current 
disciplinary proceedings for medical malpractice provided are efficient.  
5.2 Findings and Recommendations  
As has been seen, the Kenya Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act focuses more on 
punishing the practitioner and deterring future occurrences of the tort but has neglected the 
primary objective, which is to compensate victims for injuries suffered. When giving its 
determination the Board does not have the legal mandate to grant compensation and this 
discourages many victims from instituting complaints before them. The inability of the 
provided disciplinary proceedings to render justice to victims leads them to seek justice in the 
courts, which does nothing but add on to the massive case backlog that the courts are already 
plagued with. In addition, most people do not have the funds to secure representation or to 
even meet the demands in instituting proceedings in court thereby limiting their access to 
justice. 
The Act, as read together with the Rules, only has provisions on forms of punishing the guilty 
medical practitioner and does not concern itself with ways to heal things and attempt to return 
the victim back to the position they were in before the occurrence of the tort. Both retributive 
justice and restorative justice seek to punish the offender, however how they go about it 
differs. Restorative justice seeks to do this by identifying and addressing the needs and 
obligations of the victim and the society at large, while retributive justice places more 
emphasis on exerting all forms of punishment on the offender. The medical malpractice legal 
framework needs to shift towards a restorative justice stance in order to transform the system 
and the public’s belief in it.  
The main objectives of tort law are, to put the victim back to the position they were in before 
the occurrence of the tort, through compensation; to hold the tortfeasor liable and accountable 
for occurrence of the tort; and to deter future occurrences of tortious injuries. Laws governing 
medical malpractice, a subset of tort law, should therefore seek, in as much as is possible, to 
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fulfill the above objectives. In dealing with this the law needs to be reformed in order to allow 
for the recognition of the rights of the victims with regards to compensation. The penalties 
that can be meted by the Preliminary Inquiry Committee, the Professional Inquiry Committee 
and the Tribunal, during the disciplinary proceedings, provided under the Medical 
Practitioners and Dentists (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Procedure) Rules of 1979 should be 
expanded to include compensation or any other form of reparation that can be afforded to the 
victims. This will contribute largely to increasing the public’s knowledge and interest in 
bringing complaints before the Board as opposed to only seeking redress in courts or not 
bringing complaints at all.  
Another issue that has been greatly discussed in this research study is the conflict of interest 
present in the double role that the Board plays, in both representing doctors and also 
regulating the practice of medicine in the country. The self-regulation of the profession has 
engendered a protective attitude of the Board when it comes to investigating complaints by a 
patient or even rendering a judgment upon completion of an investigation. Many cases have 
been thrown out before due diligence was carried out or even in some instances where the 
practitioner has been found guilty, the penalty given to them does not correspond to the harm 
caused. 
The representative role and the regulatory role, both currently handled by the Board should 
therefore be separated in order to reduce conflict of interest. The Board has become lax in 
enforcing the rules and regulations surrounding its disciplinary role, an occurrence highly 
contributed to by the fact that it is regulating its peers. As has been discussed in the previous 
chapter, countries such as Nigeria and South Africa have managed to deal with the conflict of 
interest dilemma by devolving the representative role to a different body. UK also managed 
to reduce the conflict of interest by transferring most of the ‘exploitable’ powers outside the 
regulatory body. The first step in reducing regulatory capture is to do away with the culture of 
acquiescence that has given it room to flourish. It is therefore very vital to ensure an unbiased 
body that does not consist of members sorely from the medical field is handling the 
regulatory role. 
Aside from that, there is a scarcity of skilled medical professionals in the country, which has 
lowered the standards for the acceptance of ‘doctors’ into the medical professions. The case 
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of quack doctors infiltrating the medical profession has become very critical. Measures 
should urgently be set up to control this and the crackdown on them needs to be intensified. 
The medical field is one area where mistakes cannot and should not be tolerated, there are far 
too many lives at stake. Therefore the process of investigating and hiring doctors needs to be 
more meticulous in order to reduce the large numbers of inexperienced and unskilled doctors 
finding their way into the medical profession. It is very important to curb this before it 
becomes a serious conundrum. 
The effectiveness of a tort system in minimizing tortious acts, adequately compensating 
victims and preventing future occurrences largely depends on the public’s ability to get a fair 
trial and the public’s perception of that ability.123 The tort theory therefore breaks down if the 
general population does not anticipate the justice or does not have access to courts or the legal 
structure mandated to do so. However if the legal structure tasked with managing complaints 
of medical malpractice, in this instance the Medical Practitioners and Dentists Board, cannot 
fairly and efficiently manage these claims then the law will be ineffective in being able to 
control the issues that the reform sought to address.124 That being said, while the law needs to 
be reformed, it is also very important for the Board to ensure it effectively carries out its 
mandate.  
5.3 Conclusion 
This research has found the legal and regulatory framework for medical malpractice to be 
deficient. Having seen the plight facing the Kenyan medical malpractice system, this author 
argues that there is room for reform. However more of the reform needs to be directed 
towards the law as it carries the weight of the problem. While there has been some progress 
over the years, there is still a long way to go before the health care system is set to achieve 
the required standards of the World Health Organization. 
No medical malpractice system is perfect, taking into consideration the costs of litigation, 
quality of care, deterrence, financing, and fairness of compensation simultaneously.125 It is 
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therefore very vital for countries to adopt medical malpractice systems that are tailored to the 
conditions and the needs of their country. Kenya, in shaping its reform, should seek to borrow 
best practices of countries whose structures are similar to it. Probing these countries systems 
and looking at their efficiency, will be instrumental in determining the way forward for the 
Kenyan system.  
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